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The life of the child pornographer, while never easy, became in-
creasingly difficult in the 1980s when the federal and state governments
cast their full attention on these exploiters of children and their
pedophiliac customers. This article will review the law in this area, the
legislative and judicial process by which the federal and state government
have attempted to stamp out the trade in child pornography particularly
in the past decade and the first decision of the Supreme Court in this new
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decade making it more difficult than ever to store, handle and move such
material, even surrepticiously.
I. A DIFFERENT LEGAL STANDARD FOR MINORS EXPOSED TO
OBSCENE AND INDECENT MATERIALS.
The process began with the recognition by the Supreme Court that
the Constitution required different treatment for children and adults re-
garding exposure to obscene and indecent material. In Butler v. Michi-
gan,1 the Supreme Court struck down a section of the Michigan Penal
Code which made it a misdemeanor to distribute to the general public or
to receive any printed matter, pictures or recordings tending to incite
minors to violent, depraved or immoral acts or manifestly tending to the
corruption of the morals of minors. The defendant's conviction for vio-
lating the statute was reversed by the Supreme Court in the face of the
State's insistence that by insulating the general reading public from
books not too erotic for grown men and women in order to shield
juveniles from the world of sex, it was properly exercising its power to
promote the general welfare.
Responding to the State's position, Justice Frankfurter said, "The
incidence of this enactment is to reduce the adult population of Michigan
to reading only what is fit for children. It thereby arbitrarily curtails one
of those liberties of the individual, now enshrined in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, that history has attested as the
indispensable conditions for the maintenance and progress of a free soci-
ety." 2 But Justice Frankfurter did not say that juveniles might not in any
way be insulated by government action from adult materials protected by
the First Amendment. Indeed, he noted that Michigan had a statute on
its books not employed in the Butler prosecution designed specifically to
prevent minors from coming into contact with such adult materials. The
existence of such statutes raise the question whether First Amendment
protection for sexually oriented material might vary depending upon the
audience for such material and the participants involved in their
production.
3
1. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
2. Id. at 383-384.
3. See Lockhart and McClure, Censorship of Oscenity: The Developing Constitutional Stan-
dards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5 (1960) for the seminal discussion of the concept of variable obscenity.
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A. Minors as Audience for Adult Material
1. The Lesson of Ginsberg v. New York.
The question whether less rigorous constitutional standards of pro-
tection for sexually oriented material might be employed when minors
constitute the audience was first addressed in Ginsberg v. New York. 4
There, the operator of a lunch counter and magazine stand sold a six-
teen-year-old male two "girlie" magazines at two different times. He was
convicted on two counts of violating a section of the New York Penal
Laws which prohibited the knowing sale to minors under the age of sev-
enteen of any picture which depicts nudity and any magazine which con-
tains such pictures and which, taken as a whole, would be "harmful to
minors." The term "harmful to minors" was defined as "that quality of
... representation.., of nudity..., [which] ... (i) predominantly
appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, and (ii) is
patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a
whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and (iii) is
utterly without redeeming social importance for minors" (emphases sup-
plied). The conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Term of the New
York Supreme Court without opinion and the Court of Appeals denied
leave to appeal.
6
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court the conviction was
affirmed. At the outset of his opinion for the Court, Justice Brennan
stated that the "girlie" magazines involved were not obscene for adults
under the tripartite standard laid down in Miller v. California,7 and the
4. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
5. Formerly N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-h (McKinney 1963), now N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.20
(McKinney 1984).
6. 390 U.S. 629, 633 (1968).
7. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Following a long period of indecision and vacillation as to the general
constitutional standard to be applied in determining and suppressing obscene expression (see
Doubleday & Co., Inc. v. New York, 335 U.S. 848, 69 S. Ct. 79, 93 L.Ed. 398 (1948) (per curiam),
affirming, sub nom. People v. Doubleday & Co., Inc., 297 N.Y. 687, 71 N.Y.S.2d 736, 77 N.E.2d 6
(1947); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S. Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957); A Book Named
"John Clelan's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure v. Attorney General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S.
413 (1966), the Court in Miller laid down a three-prong test which had to be met before sexually
oriented expression could be condemned. As the first prong of the test the Court adopted the single
standard of Roth v. United States, supra, of whether the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, would find that the questioned material, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient
interest. The Court's second prong requires that the material depict or describe in a patently offen-
sive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by applicable state law. The final prong requires that the
material involved again taken as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
The Court made clear that under these conjunctive tests only "hard core" expression could constitu-
tionally be suppressed. Examples given by the Court by way of guidance to the legislatures and
courts were "(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or
perverted, actual or simulated. (b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturba-
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statute did not bar the appellant from stocking and selling the magazines
to persons seventeen years of age or older. Thus, neither the statute nor
the conviction thereunder ran afoul of the Court's decision in Butler v.
Michigan .8
Justice Brennan also rejected the appellant's argument that the de-
nial to minors under seventeen of access to material not obscene to those
seventeen years of age and older constituted a violation of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. Citing Prince v. Massachusetts,9 which had
upheld the right of state to limit the age at which persons could sell reli-
gious tracts on the streets of Boston, Justice Brennan said there were two
powerful interests that justify the difference in the constitutional treat-
ment of adult materials depending upon the age of the audience.
The first interest is state support of parents' claim of authority to
direct the rearing of their children in order that the basic structure of
society may be preserved. 10 In addition, the state has an independent
interest in the well-being of its youth stemming from the need for them to
develop into responsible adult citizens."' Recognizing those interests as
compelling justification for the subordination of First Amendment rights
of minors, the Court said that in upholding the statute and the conviction
thereunder it was only necessary that it conclude that the statutory pro-
hibition of access to adult material had a rational relationship to the
healthy development of children in society. While conceding that a
causal link between adult material and healthy maturation has not been
demonstrated, the Court justified the rationality of the legislature's ac-
tion on the basis that a causal link has not been disproved either.12
Thus it is clear that a First Amendment standard more relaxed than
that presently laid down for adults in Miller v. California prevails in
judging sexual materials communicated to minors. Given the powerful
interests at stake, this variability in First Amendment protection is not
likely to change in the foreseeable future.13
tion, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of genitals." 413 U.S. 15, 25. Ordinary "girlie
magazines depicting adult females in various stages of undress or totally nude do not fall within the
Court's definition of "hard core" pornography.
8. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
9. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
10. 390 U.S. at 639.
11. Id. at 640-641.
12. Id. at 642-643.
13. See, eg., Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, - U.S.-,-, 109 S. Ct. 2829,
2836 (1989). Bethel School Dist. No. 43 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986); Action for Children's
Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1340 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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2. Minors in the broadcast audience - FCC v. Pacifica Foundation
If reinforcement of the Ginsberg approach to children in the audi-
ence for adult material is needed it can be found in the rather colorful
(blue?) case of FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.14 There, a New York radio
station at about two in the afternoon on a school day in October of 1973
played a twelve-minute cut from a George Carlin comedy album entitled
"Filthy Words" as part of a program about contemporary society's atti-
tude toward language. Seven of the major swear words were represented
in Carlin's monologue and several of them were repeated ad nauseum 15.
A few weeks later a man, who stated that he had heard the broadcast
while driving with his young son, wrote a letter to the Federal Communi-
cations Commission complaining of the broadcast. This was, apparently,
the only complaint registered about the program. Nevertheless, the
Commission issued a declaratory order stating that the licensee, Pacifica
Foundation could have been the subject of administrative sanctions. 16
The Commission did state however that its order would be associated
with the station's license file and, in the event that subsequent complaints
were received, it would then decide whether it should utilize any of the
available sanctions authorized by Congress.
In its memorandum opinion adjudicating the complaint, the Com-
mission characterized the language used by Carlin as "patently offensive"
though not necessarily obscene and held the language as broadcast to be
indecent and therefore violative of Section 1464 of Title 18 of the United
States Code which forbids the use of "any obscene, indecent or profane
language by means of radio communications." 17
Concerned that indecent language was being broadcast at times of
the day when there is a reasonable risk that children would be in the
audience, the Commission, rather than place an absolute prohibition on
the broadcast of such language, suggested that such broadcasting be
channeled to times of the day when children most likely would not be
exposed to it. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
consider, among other things, whether the order violated First Amend-
ment protection of expression.18
14. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). See also Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, - U.S.-,
109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989) (indecent telephone communications); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422
U.S. 205, 212-214 (1975) (adult motion pictures displayed on drive-in movie screen visible from
street).
15. Id. at 729.
16. Id. at 729. Perhaps because it was a matter of first impression the Commission did not
impose any formal sanctions.
17. Id. at 731-732.
18. Id. at 732-733.
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The Court held that indecent speech was not accorded absolute con-
stitutional protection under all circumstances and in all contexts because
of its minimal expressive value. 19 Thereafter, it upheld the Commission's
order, with its potentially negative effect on the licensee, because of the
pervasive nature of broadcasting and because "broadcasting is uniquely
accessible to children . -"2o In justifying regulation of indecent broad-
cast speech which would otherwise be protected because not obscene
under the Miller standards, the Court cited Ginsberg v. New York 21 and
the government's interests in the well-being of its youth and in support-
ing parents' claims to authority in raising their children.22 "The ease
with which children may obtain access to broadcast material, coupled
with the concerns recognized in Ginsberg, amply justify special treatment
of indecent broadcasting."
23
3. The Practical Problem of Insulating Minors from Protected Adult
Material.
Having adopted a variable obscenity approach dependent on the age
of the audience and, at the same time, having clearly indicated its unwill-
ingness to reduce the reading and listening level of adults to that of chil-
dren, the Supreme Court created a difficult practical problem for the
Congress, the state legislatures and the lower federal and state courts. In
shielding minors from indecent material, regulation must be narrowly
drawn so that it does not unduly interfere with First Amendment free-
doms of adults.24 The means must be carefully tailored if they are to
withstand consitutional challenge. 25 Thus far the Supreme Court has
provided little guidance to the legislatures and courts in making the diffi-
cult choices as to means. And because of the ad hoc nature of the prob-
lem, the Court may not be able to provide much guidance in the future.
19. Id. at 747.
20. Id. at 749.
21. 390 U.S. 629.
22. 438 U.S. at 749.
23. Id. at 750. Sensitive to the charge that the regulation of indecent adult expression over
electronic media would reduce adults to hearing only what is fit for children (cf Butler v. Michigan,
352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)), the Court noted that adults could still purchase tapes and records or go to
theatres and nightclubs to hear such language or perhaps stay up late at night for indecent broad-
casting which at the date of the Pacifica decision (but not today) the FCC was "channeling" to post-
midnight hours. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1340-1341 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
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a. Print Media
One of the recurrent issues is preventing exposure of minors to non-
obscene adult magazines and books displayed for sale on magazine racks
or other places of public accommodation. The issue has been addressed
by several federal and state appellate courts.26 Confronting very nearly
the same broad regulation making it a crime on the part of magazine and
book sellers and others knowingly to display adult periodicals deemed
harmful to minors in such manner as to permit access by minors, judges
of the federal courts of appeal have divided as to the constitutionality of
such legislation. The Eighth Circuit in Upper Midwest Booksellers v. City
of Minneapolis 27 upheld a Minneapolis ordinance which included provi-
sions that adult material be sealed when displayed in places frequented
by minors, and that if the covers or packaging are themselves harmful to
minors the sealing device must be opaque.28 The term "harmful to mi-
nors" is defined in terms of the Miller tripartite test, except that the pru-
rient appeal is that addressed to minors, and patent offensiveness is that
which goes beyond what is suitable material for minors.29 The
merchants sought a declaration of unconstitutionality and an injunction
on the basis of overbreadth of the ordinance in denying access of adults
to materials protected as to them. The Eighth Circuit, citing Supreme
Court doctrine requiring that such overbreadth be real and substantial,
30
held that any overbreadth was incidental and insubstantial because the
ordinance was carefully drawn and "adults are still free to request a copy
of restricted material to view from a merchant or to peruse the material
in "adults only" bookstores or in segregated sections of ordinary retail
establishments. More significantly, "adults are still able to view any of
the material in a free and unfettered fashion by purchasing it."
'
31
But Judge Lay dissented, believing the Minneapolis ordinance to be
overly broad in its sweep and thus unconstitutional on its face. 32 Noting
26. See e.g., American Booksellers Association v. Virginia, 802 F.2d 691 (4th Cir. 1986), prob-
able jurisdiction noted 479 U.S. 1082, 107 S. Ct. 1281 (1987), questions certified to Virginia Supreme
Court 484 U.S. 383 judgment vacated and case remanded - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 254 (1988); Upper
Midwest Booksellers Assoc. v. City of Minneapolis, 780 F.2d 1389 (8th Cir. 1985); M.S. News Co. v.
Casado, 721 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1983); American Bookseller's Assoc., Inc. v. Superior Court, 129
Cal. App. 3d 197, 181 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1982); Tattered Cover, Inc. v. Tooley, 696 P.2d 780 (Colo.
1985); Dover News, Inc. v. City of Dover, 117 N.H. 1066, 381 A.2d 752 (1977) (dictum). See also
Note, Restricting Adult Access to Material Obscene as to Juveniles, 85 MICH. L. Rv. 1681 (1987).
27. 780 F.2d 1389 (8th Cir. 1985).
28. Minneapolis, Minn., City Ordinance § 385.131 (1984).
29. Id. at § 385.131(3)(e).
30. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 770 (1982). See also Osborne v. Ohio, - U.S. ,
110 S. Ct. 1691, 1701 (1990).
31. 780 F.2d at 1395.
32. Id. at 1399.
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that the ordinance provided merchants with an alternative to the sealed,
opague covers in the form of a separate area defined by a sign reading
"Adults only - you must be 18 to enter," Judge Lay would have held
both options unconstitutional. 33 As to the covers, their sealing prevents
assessment of the work as a whole in relation to minors. The cover mate-
rial might be objectionable but the inside material might not. As to the
employment of a segregated area for the display of adult materials, Judge
Lay found it constitutionally objectionable as to both minors and adults.
"Such a practice effectively prevents minors from purchasing materials
they are constitutionally entitled to purchase. Moreover, because of the
stigma attached to "adults only" stores, many adults would forgo exer-
cising their first amendment rights to purchase nonobscene literature if
such material were only available in adult bookstores. ' 34 Turning to the
rights of the booksellers, Judge Lay asserted that none of the alternatives
made available to them were acceptable.3 5
"If the bookseller decides to play it safe and establish an "adults only"
section, the storeowner would lose the patronage of minors as well as
many adults wishing to avoid the stigma attached to such bookstores.
If the bookseller chooses instead to sell only nonobscene materials in
order to avoid limiting entrance to large numbers of the buying public
(all minors and many adults), the bookseller would have to remove
from the shelves any book or magazine bearing a cover that might
possibly be deemed harmful to minors even though the content of the
book or magazine was perfectly proper for all to read."
'36
In M.S. News Co. v. Casado,37 the Tenth Circuit considered a Wich-
ita, Kansas ordinance similar in nature and language to the Minneapolis
ordinance except that it permitted display of adult material "harmful to
minors" if the material were kept behind "blinder racks" so that the
lower two-thirds of the material was not exposed to view. Again, a mag-
azine vendor had sought to have the statute declared invalid, inter alia,
on the ground of overbreadth. And again the Court of Appeals held that
the overbreadth, if any, was not significant 38. The court pointed out that
the ordinance permitted the display of material harmful to minors if it is
in appropriate blinders racks and adults can purchase it without great
difficulty.
39
33. Id at 1402.
34. Id. Judge Lay also rejected the majority's holding that the ordinance, given the content of
the material aimed at, was a valid time, place or manner restriction on expression. Id. at 1402-1404.
35. Id. at 1408.
36. Id. at 1402.
37. 721 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1983).
38. Id. at 1286-1287.
39. In Upper Midwest Booksellers, Judge Lay distinguished M.S. News Co. on the basis that the
blinder rack option permitted greater access to the material by adults. See 780 F.2d 1389, 1400 n.2.
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On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit in American Booksellers Asso-
ciation, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Virginia4° had affirmed a trial court
decision striking down a state statute prohibiting, without exception, the
knowing display of adult materials for commercial purpose in a manner
whereby juveniles might examine and peruse them. 41 The Fourth Circuit
first rejected the idea that the statute constituted a reasonable time, place
and manner restriction simply because the expression occurred in a pri-
vate place rather than in a public forum or in a place subject to a general
zoning ordinance and because the Virginia amendment imposed restric-
tions based on the content of publications. 42
The more serious flaw in the statute, according to the court, was its
breadth or, more precisely, its overbreadth.4 3 There was a considerable
difference of opinion in the trial court as to the number of books and
periodicals which might be affected by Virginia's display regulation.
Thus, the Fourth Circuit was uncertain as to the percentage of materials
in an average retail outlet which might be affected. The appellate court
was certain that booksellers faced a substantial problem attempting to
comply with the amendment in ordering, reviewing and displaying publi-
cations for sale. And the court rejected the state's suggestion that plac-
ing the materials in blinders racks or sealing them in plastic covers would
satisfy the broad mandate of the statute and the requirements of the First
Amendment as well. It specifically rejected the M.S. News and Upper
Midwest Booksellers decisions which had upheld the use of these de-
vices.44 Forcing a bookseller, therefore, to create a separate, monitored
"adults only" section or hiding adult materials "under the counter"
would only make the impact on adult access even greater because many
adults would not enter an "adults only" area or ask out loud for con-
cealed material.
40. 802 F.2d 691 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 254 (1988).
41. Virginia code Section 18.2-391(a), as amended, provides in relevant part: "It shall be unlaw-
ful for any person knowingly to sell or loan to a juvenile, or to knowingly display for commerical
purpose in a manner whereby juveniles may examine and peruse:
(1) any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, motion picture film, or similar visual rep-
resentation or image of a person or portion of the human body which depicts sexually
explicit nudity, sexual conduct or sadomasochistic abuse and which is harmful to juveniles,
or
(2) Any book, pamphlet, magazine, printed matter however reproduced or sound record-
ing which contains any matter enumerated in paragraph (1) of this subsection, or explicit
and detailed verbal descriptions or narrative accounts of sexual excitement, sexual conduct
or sadomasochistic abuse and which when taken as a whole, is harmful to juveniles" (em-
phasis supplied to show language added by the 1985 amendment.).
42. 802 F.2d at 695.
43. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
44. Id. at 696.
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While the Fourth Circuit drew the battle line clearly with the
Eighth and Tenth Circuits on how, constitutionally minors might be
shielded from adult material, its decision was vacated on appeal45 by the
Supreme Court after the Court received answers to certain questions cer-
tifled by it to the Virginia Supreme Court.46 The state court in its re-
sponse47 significantly narrowed the reach of the statute, reducing the
number of materials subject to the display provision and making clear
that for a violation to occur the booksellers would have to either know-
ingly afford juveniles the opportunity to peruse harmful materials or, be-
ing reasonably aware of minors' opportunity to peruse the adult material,
take no reasonable steps to prevent the perusal. 48 The Supreme Court's
vacation of the Fourth Circuit judgment did not therefore reach the orig-
inal First Amendment issue dividing the Circuits as to how, exactly, mi-
nors are to be insulated from the material legally available to adults.
There is also division in the state courts as to the constitutionality of
broadly worded magazine shielding statutes, with the majority of state
courts that have considered such statutes declaring them unconstitu-
tional.49 Admittedly, the problem of determining what, constitutionally,
legislature may prescribe as the means for denying access to indecent
adult print materials by minors is a difficult one because overbreadth will
result in denial to adults of constitutionally protected access to the
materials. Even though the overbreadth must be real and substantial
before legislation may be struck down,50 the line is not an easy one to
draw. But I believe that the Eighth Circuit drew the line improperly in
Upper Midwest Booksellers. I agree with dissenting Judge Lay that the
majority's upholding of the Minneapolis ordinance permits real and sub-
stantial overbreadth. Sealed covers prevent adults from making in-
formed judgments whether to buy a particular publication thus limiting
access. This overbreadth is compounded when the sealed covers are re-
quired to be opaque so that even the publication's cover cannot be viewed
by adults. It is no answer to the overbreadth problem to permit booksell-
ers and other retailers to avoid the sealed cover requirements by setting
aside an area of their premises for adult publications with a sign reading
45. - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 254, 102 L.Ed.2d 243 (1988).
46. 484 U.S. 383, 108 S. Ct. 636, 98 L.Ed.2d 782 (1988).
47. Commonwealth v. American Booksellers Assoc., Inc., 372 S.E.2d 618 (Va. 1988).
48. Id. at 624-625.
49. See American Booksellers Assoc. v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. App. 3d 197, 181 Cal. Rptr.
33 (1982); Tattered Cover Inc. v. Tooley, 696 P.2d 780 (Colo. 1985); Dover News Inc. v. City of
Dover, 117 N.H. 1066, 381 A.2d 752 (1977), Calderon v. City of Buffalo, 61 A.2d 323, 402 N.Y.S.2d
685 (1978). But see American Booksellers Assoc. v. Rendell, 332 Pa. Super. 537, 481 A.2d 919
(1984).
50. See New york v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 770 (1982); Osborne v. Ohio, - U.S. -, -, 110 S.
Ct. 1691, 1701 (1990).
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to the effect "Adults Only - you must be 18 to enter." Some adults sim-
ply will not enter "adult" bookstores because of the stigma that attaches
to the patrons. This alternative makes the denial of access to constitu-
tionally protected material complete as to these adults. 51
The Minneapolis city fathers should have been required to return to
their legislative drawing board and follow the teaching of the Colorado
Supreme Court in Tattered Cover, Inc. v. Tooley. 52 "The evolving rule
concerning the validy of display regulations is this: A display provision
will be upheld if it is so narrowly drawn that it has only an incidental
effect on the booksellers' right to sell adult materials and an adult's abil-
ity to purchase them."' 5
3
b. Motion Pictures and Electronic Media
In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,54 the city had enacted an ordi-
nance making it a crime and a public nuisance for employees of drive-in
movie theaters to aid or assist in exhibiting all photographic images of
bare human male and female buttocks, and public areas and female
breasts if such images were- visible from any public street or public
place. 55 In attempting to uphold the ordinance and the conviction of the
manager of a drive-in for violating it, the city claimed that its regulation
was an exercise of its police power to protect children. Striking down the
ordinance as facially unconstitutional, the Supreme Court held it to be
overbroad, including within its reach images clearly not obscene even as
to minors such as a baby's buttocks, the nude body of a war victim,
scenes from a culture in which nudity is indigenous and paintings of
nudes. 56 "Clearly all nudity cannot be deemed obscene even as to mi-
nors," the Court said.57 Careful discrimination as to the forms of nudity
is necessary.
Avoidance of overbreadth in regulation of the electronic media by
the federal government is also required. In 1988 the Congress, impatient
51. 780 F.2d at 1402.
52. 696 P.2d 780 (Colo. 1985).
53. Id. at 785.
54. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
55. Id. at 208. ("330.13 Drive-In Theaters, Films Visible From Public Streets or Public Places.
It shall be unlawful and it is hereby declared a public nuisance for any ticket seller, ticket taker,
usher, motion picture projection machine operator, manager, owner, or any other person connected
with or employed by any drive-in theater in the City to exhibit, or aid or assist in exhibiting, any
motion picture, slide, or other exhibit in which the human male or female buttocks, human female
bare breasts, or human bare pubic areas are shown, if such motion picture, slide, or other exhibit is
visible from any public street or public place. Violation of this shall be punishable as a Class C
offense.")
56. Id. at 212-213.
57. Id. at 213.
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with largely ineffective efforts over a five-year period in the 1980s by the
Federal Communications Commission to insulate minors from adult tele-
phone messages communicated for a fee,5 8 amended the Federal Com-
munications Act of 1934 so as to ban all obscene and indecent interstate
commercial telephone communications directed to any person regardless
of age. 59 In Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. F. C. C. ,6 the
Supreme Court upheld the provisions of the legislation prohibiting ob-
scene speech delivered by interstate telephone transmission but struck
down the portion of the legislation totally banning indecent expression.61
More recently, the Commission proposed to allow "dial-a-porn" services
to transmit their phone messages to consenting adults if the services re-
quired credit card payments, issued access codes, scrambled their
messages and asked phone companies to list 900 calls to their service on
customer bills, all to the end of preventing access to the messages by
minors.6
2
In reaching this result the Court was forced to distinguish F. C. C. v.
Pacifica Foundation.63 There, George Carlin turned out to be at least
partially correct in his legal conclusion that there are certain words one
may not utter over the air, because after a complaint was lodged, the
Federal Communications Commission granted the complaint and clari-
fied its standards governing indecent speech on the airwaves. It stated
that it had "never intended to place an absolute prohibition on the broad-
cast of this type of language, but rather sought to channel it to times of
day when children most likely would not be exposed to it."64 The Court
in Sable distinguished Pacifica on the bases that no issue of a total ban on
indecent broadcasting was before the Court there and that the uniquely
pervasive nature of over-the-air free broadcasting permitted intrusion of
objectionable material without warning and easy accessibility of children
to it. But, of course, even given its intrusive nature, the Court did not
58. The history of the Commission's regulatory efforts is set out in Sable Communications of
California v. FCC, - U.S. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 2833-2834.
59. See P. L. 100-297, 102 Stat. 424 (1988), amending section 223(b) of the Federal Communi-
cations Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.A. 223(b) (Supp. 1990).
60. - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2829.
61. Citing Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957) for the proposition that the amending stat-
ute was not reasonably restricted to preventing only minors from receiving "dial-a-porn" phone
messages. Rather, the statute would prevent all access to such messages, which are constitutionally
protected for an adult audience. See Carlin Communications, Inc. v. F.C.C., 837 F.2d 546, 549 (2d
Cir. 1988); FCC Report and Order, Regulations Concerning Indecent Communcications by Tele-
phone, Gen. Doc. No. 90-64 (adopted June 14, 1990).
62. See Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 837 F.2d 546, 549 (2d Cir. 1988); FCC Report
and Order, Regulations Concerning Indecent Communications by Telephone, Gen Doc. No. 90-64
(adopted June 14, 1990).
63. 438 U.S. 726.
64. Id. at 733.
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suggest even by way of dictum, that a complete ban of indecent broad-
casting was permissible.
65
Given the Court's recent decision in Sable, it seems safe to conclude
that a total ban on indecent electronic communications to shield the chil-
dren will not pass constitutional muster and that the Butler decision
stands as a bulwark against the reduction of mass communications to a
level of blandness that is always suitable for family viewing or listening.
B. Minors as Participants in the Production of Obscene and Indecent
Materials
While legislators, administrative agencies, prosecutors and courts
have long demonstrated a strong interest in protecting the healthy sexual
and emotional development of juveniles in our society by preventing their
premature exposure to sexual material prepared by others, an even
greater threat to normal sexual and emotional development more re-
cently encountered is the exploitation, often under mental or physical
duress, of children in the production of obscenity.66 In New York v. Fer-
ber,67 the Supreme Court had before it Section 263.15 of the New York
Penal Law which declared felonious the promotion by any person of "a
sexual performance by a child, when, knowing the character and content
thereof, he produces, directs or promotes any performance which in-
cludes sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years old."'68 It was
undisputed that the New York legislation does not require that the sex-
ual material produced with children be legally obscene under the Miller
standard in order to convict those violating its provisions. A companion
provision bans the knowing dissemination of obscene material involving
children. 69
In a criminal prosecution brought under the two sections the
Supreme Court reversed the New York Court of Appeals judgment that
65. But the Commission has now proposed a 24-hour barring of "adult" programming from the
airwaves. See Notice of Inquiry Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18
U.S.C. s1464, 4 F.C.C. Rec. 8358 (1984).
66. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749. 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON
PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 599-601 (1986); Kent & Truesdell, Spare the Child: The Constitu-
tionality of Criminalizing Possession of Child Pornography, 68 OR. L. REv. 363, 363-364 (1989).
Note, Child Pornography: A New Role for the Obscenity Doctrine, 1978 U. ILL. L. F. 711, 713.
67. 458 U.S. 747.
68. N.Y. Penal Law s263.15 (McKinney 1980).
69. Id. at § 263.10. At the time Ferber was decided, 35 states and the United States had enacted
legislation prohibiting the distribution of such materials. Twenty states, including New York, pro-
hibited the distribution of material depicting children engaged in sexual conduct without requiring
that the material be legally obscene. These statutes are listed in the opinion in Ferber. See 458 U.S.
at 749-750 n.2. See also Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber 1982 Sup. Cr.
REV. 285, 288-289.
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section 263.15 was unconstitutional on its face because it prohibited the
production of materials that were not obscene and therefore protected by
the First Amendment.70 In unanimously upholding the New York stat-
ute and the convictions thereunder, the Court began its analysis with the
question of whether a state has greater latitude under the Constitution in
proscribing works which portray sexual acts or lewd exhibitions by chil-
dren. In answering the question in the affirmative, the Court gave several
reasons. First, echoing its decision in Ginsberg, the Court pointed to the
state's interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being
of minors so that they might mature into the kind of citizens needed to
sustain a democratic society.71 The Court refused to question the state's
legislative judgment that the use of children as subjects of pornographic
material is harmful to their physiological, emotional and mental health.7 2
Second, the dissemination of photographs and films depicting sexual
activity by juveniles involves their sexual abuse because the child partici-
pants would be constantly aware that the materials produced are a per-
manent record of their activity and because the dissemination of these
"records" would exacerbate the emotional and psychological harm to
them. If children are to be protected from such abuse, the distribution of
indecent as well as obscene materials involving child participants must be
disrupted. The most expeditious if not the only practical means to this
end would be to disrupt the supply of the materials by imposing severe
criminal penalties on those involved in the sale and promotion of the
product.
73
According to the Court, limiting law enforcement in this area only
to the distribution of materials meeting the Miller standard would not
serve the state's very strong interest in protecting its children from sexual
abuse. 74 The Miller standard was held to be inadequate here because
(1) the "prurient interest" prong bears no connection to the issue of
whether a child has been physically or psychologically harmed in the
production of the work; (2) a sexually explicit depiction involving a
child need not meet the "patently offensive" prong in order to involve
sexual exploitation; and (3) a work which, taken as a whole, contains
"serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value," may nevertheless
70. New York v. Ferber, 52 N.Y. 674, 678, 439 N.Y.S.2d 863, 865, 422 N.E.2d 523, 525 (1981).
71. 458 U.S. at 756-757.
72. Id. at 758. Nor would the Court question the relevant literature on child pornography and
mental health that comes to the same judgment. Id. at n.9.
73. Id. at 759-760. It takes two to make a market-a willing seller and a willing buyer. The
attack on the willing buyer occured in Osborne v. Ohio. - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 1691, discussed supra
at notes 117-130 and accompanying text.
74. Id. at 761.
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contain a hard core of child pornography and abuse.75
The Court adjusted the Miller formulation. "A trier of fact need
not find that the material appeals to the prurient interest of the average
person; it is not required that sexual conduct portrayed be done so in a
patently offensive manner; and the material at issue need not be consid-
ered as a whole."' 76 The Court thus permitted all child pornography to
be treated as if it were legally obscene in relation to an adult audience.
In making this departure from Miller, the Court believed that the
value of permitting live performances and photographic reproductions of
children engaged in lewd sexual conduct was at best minimal. But be-
cause the Court's central rationale in Ferber is the imperative of protect-
ing actual children from harm, the Court limited the departure from
prevailing First Amendment law to material that visually depicts chil-
dren below the age specified by the relevant statute. Distribution of de-
scriptions or other depictions of sexual conduct, not otherwise obscene,
which do not involve live performances or visual reproduction of live
performances retains normal First Amendment protections.
77
By almost any First Amendment measure, New York v. Ferber is an
extraordinary case. It identifies a new category of expression, non-ob-
scene visual depiction of sexual activity by children, that is to be denied
First Amendment protection. But this casting out from First Amend-
ment protection is not based, as other denials of such protection have
been, on the effect on the potential audience for the expression, but
rather on the effect on the participants (children) involved in the creation
of the expression.78 Perhaps without fully realizing it, the Court created
a new category of expression excluded from First Amendment protection
and did so without spelling out the parameters of that category. 79 At this
point it cannot be determined whether the category includes other vari-
eties of expression harmful to the participants themselves.
75. Id at 761.
76. Id. at 764.
77. Id. at 764-75.
78. Compare, eg., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (effect of racial or religious
group libel on members of the group); Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974)
(effect of false light invasion of privacy on those portrayed in a false light); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (effect of "fighting words" on those to whom they are directed);
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (effect of libel on private persons); Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (effect of anti-war and anti-recruitment publications on potential
recruits and enlistees in the armed services); cf New York Times Co. vv. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971) (effect on the nation's enemies by disclosure of military and diplomatic secrets).
79. See Schauer, note 53 at 294.
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C. The Federal Child Protection Act of 1984 - Getting Tough with
Child Pornographers
Recognizing that child pornography was becoming a serious na-
tional problem, 80 the Congress enacted the Protection of Children
Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977.1 The act imposed criminal
penalties of up to $10,000 fines or ten years imprisonment or both on
anyone who "employed, used, persuaded, induced, enticed or coerced
any minor to engage in any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of
producing any visual or print depiction of such conduct knowing or hav-
ing reason to know that such visual or print depiction would be trans-
ported in interstate or foreign commerce or will be mailed".8 2 Parents,
legal guardians or persons having custody or control of minors who
knowingly permitted minors to engage in such conduct for the purpose of
producing visual or print depictions were subject to the same criminal
penalties if they knew or had reason to know that such depictions would
be transported in interstate commerce or mailed.
83
At the other end of the child pornography traffic even stiffer crimi-
nal penalites might be imposed upon those who knowingly transported
or shipped in interstate or foreign commerce or the mail for the purpose
of sale or distribution for sale any obscene visual or print depiction using
a minor engaged in "sexually explicit conduct" for its production. 4 In
defining sexually explicit conduct, Congress chose to list "hardcore" ac-
tivities meeting the Miller test for patent offensiveness.8 5
80. The problem may in part be of the federal government's own making. Confiscated child
pornographic materials are being circulated in sting operations to trap pedophiles interested in buy-
ing these materials. See United States v. Musslyn, 865 F.2d 945 (8th Cir. 1989); State v. Steadman,
152 Wis.2d 293, 448 N.W. 2d 267 (Wis. App. 1989). The recent increase in federal criminal indict-
ments may be due to "the mass marketing of child pronography by the United States Custom and
the United States Postal Inspection Services." Stanley, The child Porn Myth, 7 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L. REv. 295, 321-322 text at rn. 134-136 (1989). Risking the escape of previously purchased
or confiscated child pornography in the course of "sting," operations seems at the very least hypo-
critical (if not immoral and illegal) on the part of agencies supposedly dedicated to removing such
material from circulation.
81. P.L. 95-225, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 7, condified as 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2251-2253 (West 1982). For a
thorough exposition of the history of anti-child pronography legislation, see Note, The Child Protec-
tion Act of 1984: Child Pornography and the First Amendment, 9 SITON HALL LEGIS. J. 331-335
(1985).
82. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2251(a), (c) (West 1982).
83. Id. § 2251(b).
84. Id. § 2252(a). "Any person who violated this section shall be fined not more than $10,000,
or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both, but, if such person has a prior conviction under this
section, such person shall be fined not more than $15,000, or imprisoned not less than two years nor
more than 15 years, or both." Id. § 2252(b).
85. Id. § 2253(2).
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Effectiveness of the act was severely limited by the requirements that
child pornography in interstate foreign commerce or in the mails be le-
gally obscene as then apparently mandated by Miller v. California 86 and
that those transporting such material in interstate or foreign commerce
or through the mails do so for the purpose of sale or distribution for
sale.87 If the motivation for the legislation was the protection of chil-
dren,88 these requirements stood in the way of achieving that goal be-
cause children could be sexually exploited or abused even if the
depictions were legally obscene or were not produced for commercial
gain.
Following the Supreme Court's determination in Ferber 89 that those
involved in the production and distribution of child pornography could
be constitutionally prosecuted when the material involved was not legally
obscene, the Congress went back to its drawing board. In 1984, Con-
gress enacted the Child Protection Act9° amending the 1977 legislation
to eliminate the need to establish the obscenity of child pornography and
the commercial purpose for its transport or shipment in interstate or for-
eign commerce or the mail.91 Criminal fines were increased substantially
for individuals and imposed for the first time on organizations. 92 Upon
conviction for violations of the act there would also be imposed auto-
matic criminal forfeitures of property derived from gross profits or other
proceeds obtained from violations of the act as well as property used or
intended to be used to commit such violations. 93 Civil forfeitures of
other property could also be sought by the Government. 94 The upper
age limit of minority was raised from under sixteen in the 1977 act to
under eighteen in the amended act.95
After substantially strengthening the anti-child pornography law in
1984, Congress came back again in 1986 to close a loophole regarding the
interstate transportation of children for purposes of producing child por-
86. 413 U.S. 15.
87. See H. Rep. No. 536, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 2-3, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ASMIN. NEWS 492494; Note, Private Possession of Child Pornography: The Tensions Between Stan-
ley v. Georgia and New York v. Ferber, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 187, 199 (1987); Note, The Child
Protection Act of 1984: Child Pornography and the First Amendment 9 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 335-
336 (1985).
88. See S. Rep. No. 438, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 47; cf. 129 Cong. Rec. H. 9780 (daily ed., Nov. 14, 1983) (Remarks of Rep. Hughes (D.-
N.J.).
89. 458 U.S. 747.
90. P.L. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (1984), codified as 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2251-2255 (Supp. 1989).
91. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252(a) (Supp. 1989).
92. See Id. §§ 2251(c), 2252(b).
93. See Id. § 2253(a).
94. See Id. § 2254(a).
95. See Id. § 2255(1).
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nography.96 The 1986 amendments known as the Child Sexual Abuse
and Pornography Act 97 made criminal the transportation of minors in
interstate or foreign commerce, or in any United States territory or pos-
session with the intent that the minors engage in any sexually explicit
conduct for the purpose of producing visual depictions of such conduct
and broadened the term visual depiction in the legislation to include un-
developed film and videotape.98 The 1986 legislation also amended the
Mann Act to make it gender neutral regarding the transportation in in-
terstate or foreign commerce of minors for illegal sexual purposes.99
Further amendment of the anti-child pornography law was made in
1988 in Title VII, subtitle N, sections 7511-7513 of the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act.100 The changes effected include the criminalization of the use of
computers in interstate child pornography trafficking' 0 ' and the buying
and selling of or the offering to buy or sell minors knowing that the mi-
nors will be employed in the production of visual depictions of sexually
explicit conduct. Very heavy fines and imprisonment for not less than 20
years are prescribed for violation of the child buying and selling
prohibitions. 102
The 1984 amendments appear to have to some extent broken the
logjam on law enforcement. During the more than six years from enact-
ment of the "Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act" in
1977 to passage of the 1984 amendments, there were a total of 69 individ-
uals indicted and 65 individuals convicted of violating the original act.
From the effective date of the 1984 amendments through the time of the
House of Representatives' consideration of the 1986 amendments, 274
individuals had been indicted and 214 individuals had been convicted of
violating the amended act.'
03
In large part, the increased effectiveness of law enforcement is the
result of the attitude of the judiciary. The federal courts have consist-
ently upheld the constitutionality of this legislative scheme in the face of
96. See H. Rep. No. 910, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5952-5953.
97. P.L. 99-628, 100 Stat. 3510 (1986), codfied as 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2251(c), 2256(5) (Supp.
1989).
98. Id
99. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2424 (Supp. 1989).
100. P.L. 100-690, 102 Stat 4485 (1988), codified as 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2251(c), 2251A, 2252(a),
2257 (Supp. 1989).
101. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2251(c), 2252(a) (Supp. 1989).
102. Id. § 2251A.
103. See H. Rep. 910, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 4-5, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5954.
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claims of vagueness, 104 lack of notice of the applicable community whose
standards would apply,105 imposition of strict felony liability,1°6 imposi-
tion of cruel or unusual punishment' 0 7 and denial of equal protection of
the law.10 8 Those actually convicted under this legislative scheme have
fared no better with their claims of lack of sufficiency of evidence of vio-
lations, 109 errors in the admissibility of evidence 10 or the affirmative de-
fense of entrapment.' And complaints about harsh sentences also meet
with little judicial sympathy."12
II. No LEGAL PLACE TO HIDE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
At the same time, however, the combination of strengthened legisla-
tion, tough law enforcement, sympathetic judges and a high conviction
rate with stiff sentences has had the unintended consequence of driving
the child pornographers even deeper underground, taking with them
their underage victims.
113
This, of course, makes the goal of eradication of the traffic much
more difficult. Reaching supply operations whether in nondescript
garets, abandoned warehouses or even in apparently respectable homes at
the time of production distribution or sale is a chancy and sometime
thing. Another approach complementing the increasingly difficult opera-
tion of disrupting supply would be to destroy demand by criminalizing
the use and possession, of child pornography. A number of states have
104. See United States v. O'Malley 854 F.2d 1085, 1086 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Fo-
garty, 663 F.2d 928, 930 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Reedy, 845 F.2d 239, 241 (10th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Nemuras, 567 F. Supp. 87, 90 (D. Md. 1983) ('Mhe statute is sufiliciently clear
that anyone with a modicum of common sense and a knowledge of the English language and of
human nature can understand what is prohibited by it.")
105. See United States v. Langford, 688 F.2d 1088, 1094-1095 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 461
U.S. 959, 103 S. Ct. 2433, 77 L.Ed.2d 1319 (1983).
106. See United States v. Esch, 832 F.2d 531, 536 (10th Cir. 1987), cert denied 485 U.S. 908, 991
(1988); United States v. Fenton, 654 F. Supp. 379, 380 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
107. See United States v. Anderson, 610 F. Supp. 246, 250 (D. Ind. 1985), aff'd 803 F.2d 903
(7th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1069 (1987).
108. See United States v. Freeman, 808 F.2d. 1290, 1292-1293 (8th Cir.), cert denied 480 U.S.
922 (1987).
109. See United States v. Marchant, 803 F.2d 174, 176-177 (5th Cir. 1986); United Stites v.
Adams, 694 F.2d 200, 202 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 462 U.S. 1118 (1983).
110. See United States v. Garot, 801 F.2d 1241, 1246-1247 (10th Cir. 1986).
111. See United States v. Rubio, 834 F.2d 442, 450-451 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. John-
son, 855 F.2d 299, 303-304 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Fletcher, 672 F. Supp. 1145, 1147-1148
(N.D. Iowa 1987).
112. See United States v. Ames, 743 F.2d 46 (1st Cir. 1984), cerL denied 469 U.S. 1165 (1985)
(sentence of five years sustained); United States v. Freeman, 663 F. Supp. 73 (E.D. Ark. 1987)
(sentence of six years sustained when average sentence for the same offense was allegedly 3.1).
113. See Osborne v. Ohio, -U.S. -- , -110 S. Ct. 1691, 1697, 109 L.Ed.2d 98, 109-111 (1990);
Kent & Trusdell, note 50 at 392.
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taken this approach 14 but until recently serious doubt existed as to the
constitutionality of such legislation because of the prior Supreme Court
decision of Stanley v. Georgia.115 There the Court had ruled that the
First Amendment prohibits government from making mere private pos-
session of obscene material a crime. According to the Court as then con-
stituted, the "right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their
social worth.., is fundamental to our free society.... [A]lso fundamen-
tal is the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from un-
wanted intrusions into one's privacy."11 6
Because of the strongly perceived need of society to eliminate the
exploitation of children which the child pornography trade necessitates,
the United States Supreme Court in Osborne v. Ohio 117 rose above these
fundamental principles to strike a major blow against the market for
child pornography. There, local police found photographs in the appel-
lant Osborne's home each of which depicted a nude male adolescent
posed in a sexually explicit position. Osborne was convicted of violating
an Ohio statute which criminalized the mere possession or viewing of
material or performance that depicts a minor not the person's child or
ward in the nude, except under certain narrow exceptions not applicable
to him.118 He was sentenced to six months in prison and his convictions
and sentence was affirmed by the intermediate appeals court and the
Ohio Supreme Court,1 9 which rejected his contention that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the states from enforcing legislation
punishing the private possession of child pornography.
On appeal the Supreme Court, in upholding the constitutionality of
the Ohio statute though reversing the conviction for instructional error
114. See Kent & Truesdell, note 50 at 372 n.35, 378-381 for a review of state legislation and
judicial decisions.
115. 394 U.S. 577.
116. Id. at 564.
117. - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 1691.
118. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.323(A)(3) (Supp. 1989) which provides inter alia:
(A) No person shall do any of the following:
"(3) Possess or view any material or performance that shows a minor who is not the
person's child or ward in a state of mudity, unless one of the following applies:
"(a) The material or performance is sold, disseminated, displayed, possessed, con-
trolled, brought or caused to be brought into this state, or presented for a bona fide artistic,
medical scientific, educational, religious, governmental, judicial, or other proper purpose,
by or to a physician, psychologist, sociologist, scientist, teacher, person pursuing bona fide
studies or research, librarian, clergyman, prosecutor, judge, or other person having a
proper interest in the material or proformance.
"(b)) The person knows that the parents, guardian, or custodian has consented in
writing to the photographing or use of the minor in a state of nudity and to the manner in
which the material or performance is used or transferred."
119. 110 S. Ct. 169.
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denying Osborne procedural due process, 120 emphasized that Stanley was
a narrow holding and that since that decision the value of permitting
child pornography has been deemed "exceedingly modest, if not de
minimis."1 21 The Court, per Justice White, went on to assume for pur-
pose of argument that Osborne had a First Amendment interest in view-
ing and possessing child pornography but it nevertheless upheld the Ohio
statute. It distinguished Stanley on the basis that the state's interests
underlying child pornography prohibitions far exceeded the interests jus-
tifying the Georgia law prohibiting adult obscenity at issue in Stanley.
1 22
There, the state was exercising paternalistic control to protect the minds
of its citizens from being poisoned by obscenity. Georgia's interest was
viewed as insufficient to overcome the constitutional protection of a per-
son's private thoughts.1 23 In Osborne the state was not attempting pater-
nalistic control of the defendant's mind but rather protection of the
victims of child pornography by attempting to destroy the market for the
exploitation of children.1 24 Repeating language in Ferber 125 the Court
said:
[it] is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State's interest in
'safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor' is
'compelling.' . . . The legislative judgment as well as the judgment
found in relevant literature, is that the use of children as subjects of
pornographic materials is harmful to the physiological, emotional, and
mental health of the child. That judgment, we think, easily passes
muster under the First Amendment.
The Court then added that "[i]t is also surely reasonable for the State to
conclude that it will decrease the production of child pornography if it
penalizes those who possess and view the product, thereby decreasing
demand."
126
To bolster its decision subordinating individual interests of exposure
to pornographic communicative materials and protection from govern-
ment intrusion into personal privacy, the Court recognized two other in-
terests supporting the Ohio statute. First, as noted in Ferber, the
materials produced by child pornographers permanently record the vic-
tim's abuse and do continuing damage to the children for years to come.
120. The jury was not instructed that it could convict for violation of Ohio Rev. Code. Ann.
§ 2907.323(A)(3) only if the State proved scienter and that the defendant possessed material depict-
ing a lewd exhibition, or a graphic focus on a child's genitals. - U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 1703-1705,
109 L.Ed.2d at 117-119.
121. See 458 U.S. at 762.
122. Id. at 1692-1693.
123. Id. at 1696.
124. - U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 1695-1697.
125. 458 U.S. at 756-758.
126. Id. at 757-760.
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Criminalizing possession and viewing encourages destruction of such ma-
terial. Second, encouragement of destruction is also desirable because it
deprives pedophiles of a tool to seduce other children into sexual
activity. 1
27
One effect of Osborne v. Ohio should be to make child
pornographers more vulnerable to successful prosecution because once
the pornographer finishes producing his material he must still handle and
store it. Probable cause is all that is required for law enforcement au-
thorities to obtain a warrant to search for such contraband. 128 The
Fourth Amendment standards for searching out and seizing child por-
nography are not greater than those imposed for obscene materials and
other things.129 The fact that pornographers may sometimes use adults
who have the appearance of chidren under the age of eighteen does not
affect probable cause warrants. As the Ninth Circuit said in United
States v. Wiegand,
[The predicate of many statutory rape laws is to tell the difference in
the age of the victim. If such laws are not unconstitutional because a
mistake as to age might be made, it is difficult to hold a warrant uncon-
stitutional because error [as to the age of the participants] could occur
under its direction. 
130
Possessing child pornography either physically or constructively is now
very risky and if one is caught with the goods it will likely result in prose-
cution, conviction and lengthy incarceration.
The other effect of the Osborne decision, as suggested by the Court,
might be to reduce the market for child pornography. Though the ab-
stract theory makes sense the actual effect on demand is questionable
since the compulsion of pedophiles to collect child pornography may
often exceed the fear of punishment for being caught in possession of it.
It may be noted that criminal child molestation statutes have not, unfor-
tunately, eliminated child molestation. Whatever the actual effect of Os-
borne, the Court has sent a strong message to the child pornographers
and their customers that society need not tolerate any of their activities,
including the passive one of possessing this exploitive material whether in
a storage room, a warehouse or even in the privacy of one's own home.
Osborne marks the culmination of a long legislative and judicial process
by the states and federal government to distinguish child pornography
from ordinary obscenity and to eliminate it from our society.
127. Id. at 759.
128. See United States v. wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239, 1242 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied 484 US.
856 (1987).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1243
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III. CONCLUSION
Setting aside the arguments of the moralists and those who believe
but cannot prove a causal link between the exposure of juveniles to por-
nography and later criminal sexual behavior, a strong case can be made
for tough federal and state legislation protecting children from exposure
to and participation in the production of pornography if we grant the
premise that children are different from adults and need to be nurtured
differently.131 Again, while there is an absence of empirical data, some
psychiatrists (particularly child psychiatrists) believe from their profes-
sional observation of patients with emotional and sexual dysfunction that
permissive exposure of children to obscene and indecent materials may
distort the normal maturation process.
[Psychiatrists]... made a distinction between the reading of pornogra-
phy, as unlikely to be per se harmful, and the permitting of the reading
of pornography, which was conceived as potentially destructive. The
child is protected in his reading of pornography by the knowledge that
it is pornographic, !a, disapproved. It is outside of parental standards
and not a part of his identification processes. To openly permit implies
parental approval and even suggests seductive encouragement. If this
is so of parental approval, it is equally so of societal approval - another
potent influence on the developing ego. 132
Given the concern expressed by some of the closest observers of the
maturation process, I believe the Supreme Court is correct in upholding
legislation that criminalizes the knowing exposure of minors to sexual
materials that may not be legally obscene but are of an "adult" indecent
nature. Since the harmful exposure is magnified as to those children im-
posed upon to participate in the production of pornography, legislation
outlawing the involvement of minors in production of both obscene and
indecent visual materials and the mere possession of these materials is
also amply justified. The First Amendment should not be viewed as so
inflexible as to permit the placing of society's youth at risk of sexual
abuse and distorted emotional development.
131. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758, n.9. Gaylin Book Review, 77 YALE L.J. 579,
592-593 (1968) (reviewing R. KUH, FOOLISH FIGLEAVES (1967)).
132. Gaylin, Book Review, 77 YALE L.J. 579, 564 (1968) (reviewing R. KuH, FOOLISH
FIGLEAVES (1967)).

